AI Engineer World's Fair 2026

When Will The Benchmaxxing Plague End?

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When Will The Benchmaxxing Plague End?

A leaderboard can reward progress that users never feel. Nick Heiner traces how benchmark design, verification shortcuts, and lab incentives create that gap—and what better evaluation requires.

From a talk by Nick Heiner

The release chart meets actual use

A new model arrives with a big announcement and impressive benchmark charts. Sometimes the charts themselves stretch the comparison. Then people use the model, discover that it does not meet their expectations, and accuse the lab of benchmaxxing: training toward benchmark success in ways that diverge from what users actually care about. The score improved; the experience did not.

Slide titled “Model Release Hype Cycle” with three numbered steps, an annotated benchmark chart, a TechCrunch headline about Meta’s benchmarks, and a user comment.Open full source frame
The model release hype cycle: announcement, actual use, and allegations of benchmaxxing.

That gap raises two different questions: why do benchmarks fail to reflect useful capability, and is the failure unavoidable? Nick Heiner’s answer is that incentives and poor methodology explain much of the problem. Neither makes trustworthy evaluation impossible. The task is to understand where the measurement loses contact with the work it is supposed to represent.

0:190:32
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Why weak benchmarks remain influential

Heiner describes millions of dollars wagered on LM Arena outcomes in prediction markets, even while industry figures publicly discuss gaming its rankings. He invokes Gwern’s criticism that an easily gamed benchmark may do more harm than good, then Karpathy’s observation that his preferred models did not match Arena’s ordering. Karpathy’s concern, as presented here, is that teams may be making better Arena models rather than better models overall—with nested lists, bullet points, and emojis standing in for useful improvement.

The persistence of those rankings has a straightforward mechanism. AI is available to an enormous audience, and that audience needs help choosing models. Assessing benchmark methodology requires expertise and time; recognizing a popular leaderboard does not. Popularity becomes a substitute for validity, reinforcing incumbency and marketing. Heiner includes himself in the problem: without inspecting a benchmark in detail, he does not consider himself equipped to judge it. Understanding the failure modes is therefore a prerequisite to interpreting the scores.

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Good tasks are expensive to create and replace

Consider an agentic coding benchmark with tasks created by software engineers. Heiner’s hypothetical estimate puts construction at $15 million for 1,000 tasks requiring 60 hours each, with engineers costing $500,000 per year. That arithmetic implies 2,000 working hours per engineer-year: $250 per hour, or $15,000 per task. Under the same estimate, replacing one-third of the tasks each year costs another $5 million annually. Replacement matters because improving models progressively exhaust the useful difficulty of existing tasks.

A budget like that pushes benchmark creators toward shortcuts. The price slide pairs public training data with contamination, AI assistance with circularity, small samples with noise, and cheap labor with missing expertise. Heiner focuses on the expertise problem: a benchmark intended to measure progress beyond current models needs knowledge and judgment from outside those models. Heavy reliance on AI-generated tasks risks reproducing the frontier’s existing limits, while cheaper labor can remove the expertise needed to recognize a meaningful challenge.

Slide titled “Price” with a task-cost calculation and a four-row table linking public training data to contamination, AI assistance to circularity, small samples to noise, and cheap labor to low quality and missing expertise.Open full source frame
Benchmark creation costs and the quality risks of common workarounds.

Surge’s stated response is to pay for strong workers and prioritize quality over minimum cost. Heiner argues that this is especially necessary given the capabilities of models in 2026: creating useful tests increasingly requires people who can do more than the systems being tested.

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Public tests can become remembered answers

Contamination does not require a deliberate decision to train on the test set. With large volumes of incoming training data, keeping public benchmark questions and answers out of a model requires active effort. Labs must resist that inflow; once test material is widely available online, some memorization becomes a predictable risk.

For SWE-bench Verified, Heiner reports that giving Opus the beginning of a benchmark prompt causes it to reproduce the remainder verbatim, and that it can reproduce answers as well. Surge’s investigation, he says, compared memorization of benchmark material with memorization of other content from the same repositories. That comparison matters because it asks whether benchmark items are unusually familiar, rather than merely showing that a coding model has encountered a public repository.

Heiner also says that the Opus 4.8 model card reports a SWE-bench score without disclosing the contamination his team found. The specific experiment and disclosure allegation are his claims; the broader consequence is that consumers cannot properly contextualize a score without knowing whether successful answers reflect fresh problem solving or remembered test material.

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The verifier can reward the wrong thing

Reward hacking occurs when a model satisfies the letter of a scoring rule while evading the intended task. Heiner suggests treating reward design as an adversarial process against an agent seeking the easiest possible success. His analogy is gradient descent as water flowing downhill: it finds the path of least resistance. A verifier has to make that path correspond to doing the work, rather than exploiting a loophole.

A verifier can also make the opposite mistake: rejecting a useful answer because it tests an unnecessarily narrow representation. In Heiner’s AutomationBench example, an agent makes tool calls in an enterprise environment, but a phone-number check accepts only one hard-coded string. Several formats represent the same number, and the prompt does not specify which format the verifier requires.

In Heiner’s phone-number task example, Haiku and Fable both score 20%, although he says Fable gets the task right 80% of the time and loses credit for choosing different formats. Haiku’s score reflects mistakes; Fable’s reflects a mismatch between acceptable behavior and the verifier. Those percentages concern his particular example, not an aggregate AutomationBench result. A test that gives those behaviors the same score has erased the capability difference it was meant to measure.

Benchmarks are supposed to act as a lighthouse for approaching capabilities, including systems that could change entire industries. A hidden string-format requirement cannot carry that responsibility. The check must distinguish failure at the task from harmless variation in how a successful result is represented.

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Instruction following needs product judgment

A benchmark expresses a view of what an AI system should do. Choosing tasks and success criteria is therefore a product decision as well as a measurement decision. Heiner describes benchmarks as aspirational artifacts: they encode desired behavior and values. His criticism of IFEval begins with that choice of target.

Despite its frequent appearance in model cards, Heiner characterizes IFEval’s prompts as arbitrary requests combined with additional constraints. Avoiding all commas or using the letter T at most once is easy to specify mechanically, but its relevance depends on a further assumption: improvement on such constraints must generalize to instructions users actually give. A check being reproducible does not establish that connection.

Some examples, he says, fail before the model even responds because their requirements conflict:

Requested behaviorConflicting requirement
Repeat the response verbatimTranslate it into Hindi
Include exactly one bullet pointInclude a few bullet points

A model cannot satisfy both sides of either pair as presented. The resulting failure score cannot cleanly identify an instruction-following weakness.

Other problems appear inside the checking logic. Heiner points to sentence splitting that differs from human interpretation, then a story-writing prompt whose verifier never checks whether the answer is a story. It checks only whether ASCII I appears more than once. That leaves the main requested behavior outside the measurement.

The displayed response D exploits that gap by substituting Cyrillic І for ASCII I, earning full credit under the check Heiner describes. The following Python example isolates the same character-count mechanism with a short teaching string:

python

ASCII_I = "\u0049"
CYRILLIC_I = "\u0406"

def passes_character_limit(text: str) -> bool:
    return text.count(ASCII_I) <= 1

original = "I arrived. I waited."
substituted = original.replace(ASCII_I, CYRILLIC_I)

assert not passes_character_limit(original)
assert passes_character_limit(substituted)

The substitution changes the code points without doing anything to improve the writing. More fundamentally, this predicate cannot establish that a story was written. Closing the Unicode loophole alone would leave that missing requirement unresolved.

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Quality control is part of measurement

Even a sensible benchmark design requires operational discipline. Heiner describes APEX as a retrieval task in which an agent receives files and answers questions about them. In the examples he criticizes, file contents disagree with the expected answers in the rubric. An agent can therefore follow the supplied evidence and receive a negative score for doing so.

He also reports obvious placeholder values and nonexistent dates or places. These suggest synthetic construction, though they do not establish how the data was produced. Their evaluation cost is more direct: recognizably artificial inputs can tell the model that it is being tested, creating evaluation awareness, while also moving the task away from the distribution of real working data. Bad inputs and inconsistent rubrics are benchmark-creation failures; labs can then compound them through how they optimize and report results.

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Optimizing past what people prefer

The reason to evaluate models is ultimately to understand how well they serve people. Having humans inspect and rate responses provides a direct signal, but it is expensive. Benchmarks often try to distill that judgment into a cheaper, more scalable proxy. Their usefulness depends on how faithfully the proxy preserves the human judgment it replaces.

A rising benchmark score can coexist with flat or declining human preference. At first, optimizing the proxy may improve both. Later, benchmark performance can keep increasing after human evaluation stops improving; pushed further, it can improve while human ratings fall. Marketing pressure, organizational politics, and internal incentives can make continuing that optimization attractive despite the divergence.

Heiner illustrates the mismatch with a simple prompt: “What time is it?” The displayed answer expands it into an elaborate response with bold text, emoji, bullet points, and multiple options. He describes it as an Arena success that a human evaluator would reject. The example makes the failure concrete: presentation features associated with winning a comparison can overwhelm the small, direct task the user actually gave.

Slide titled “Prioritize The Benchmark Over Human Evals” showing the prompt “what time is it?” and an elaborate response with bold text, emoji, bullet points, and multiple options.Open full source frame
An LMArena-optimized response turns “what time is it?” into a lengthy, embellished answer.
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Anonymous voting and selective disclosure

Heiner then describes stories he has heard about hiring crowdsourced voters to favor a model on LM Arena, alleging insufficient voter filtering. This is a hearsay account, not a demonstrated incident. The proposed mechanism would defeat anonymity through an output watermark: the model emits a recognizable signal, and paid voters use it to identify which response to select. Hiding the model’s name would not prevent coordinated voting if the response itself reveals its identity.

Evaluation conditions create another route to misleading comparisons. Scores collected under different or unrepresentative conditions become difficult to interpret when those conditions are not disclosed. Heiner connects this problem to the Arena research in The Leaderboard Illusion: repeated private testing and selective disclosure can let a lab optimize against the evaluation while outsiders see only the selected result.

Heiner cites a chart reporting that Meta tested 27 private model variants before the Llama 4 release without disclosing that testing. The number concerns private variants, not publicly released models or a quantified amount of score inflation. The interpretive problem is selection: an apparently comparable leaderboard entry may represent a substantially different testing and optimization process from another entry.

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Build the benchmark around deployment

Raising the standard starts with people who understand the work. Human experts should shape the tasks, the definition of success, the input files, and the available tools. Their involvement cannot be confined to answering questions after the benchmark’s structure has already been decided.

For a medical benchmark, doctors who can answer clinical questions supply necessary expertise, but not all the expertise required to evaluate hospital deployment. Whether an agent is ready to work in a hospital also depends on the business setting, regulatory environment, and legal requirements. Those conditions change which tasks are appropriate to test and what successful behavior means. A benchmark of medical knowledge and a benchmark of deployment readiness therefore need different task design.

The environment must then support that design:

  • Faithful inputs: Prefer data drawn from real work and created by actual people. Synthetic inputs are possible, but Heiner emphasizes how difficult it is to make them reliably realistic.
  • Working tools: Tools should perform their advertised functions. Unless handling broken tools is the capability under test, tool bugs add noise rather than useful difficulty.
13:0913:18
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Align the prompt, verifier, and apparent ceiling

Prompt–verifier alignment must work in both directions. Every requested behavior needs appropriate verification, and every enforced requirement needs to correspond to the task the model was actually given. Missing coverage allows shortcuts such as passing a character check without writing a story. Extra requirements punish legitimate behavior, as in the unspecified phone-number format. Both introduce noise into the score.

Thorough quality control is needed across the benchmark, together with a private holdout set to resist contamination. Otherwise, an apparent capability ceiling may actually be a defect ceiling. In Heiner’s illustrative saturation scenario, a lab stops around 80% because the remaining 20% of tasks are broken. That is different from exhausting the model’s capacity to improve on valid tasks.

The difficulty is that a lab may not know which tasks are broken until it has solved the others. During the climb, defective tasks still contribute rewards and penalties. If those errors systematically favor some behaviors over others, they can distort relative model rankings rather than simply making every score a little less precise. Saturation can thus expose a measurement problem that was affecting comparisons all along.

14:2614:40
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Paying for the judgment the task requires

Surge’s Hemingway Bench applies this reasoning to writing. Heiner argues that writing is too rich, nuanced, and human to assess adequately through mechanical checks. He also rejects relying on LLM judges for this purpose because, in his view, they lack the writing taste needed to evaluate progress beyond their own capabilities. It is the earlier frontier problem again: a system’s existing judgment may not be sufficient to measure improvement beyond it.

Heiner describes a workforce of thousands of professional writers spanning technical writing, poetry, journalism, and editing. Professional writers make blind model comparisons, which are used to produce the leaderboard. The workforce description is his account of Surge’s approach; it should not be confused with a count of individual judges participating in any particular benchmark release.

This does not eliminate the cost problem introduced at the beginning. Professional judgment is expensive, and Heiner explicitly accepts that expense as the consequence of prioritizing evaluation quality. For writing, Surge’s response is to retain the human judgment that a cheaper proxy would otherwise attempt to replace.

Benchmaxxing exploits the gap between a benchmark and human preference. Closing that gap requires responsibility from both sides: benchmark makers must build measurements worth optimizing, and the people reporting results must hold those measurements and their conditions to a higher standard. Heiner includes himself among the benchmark creators who owe the industry that standard.

White closing slide containing a single statement defining benchmaxxing as exploitation of benchmark misalignment with human preference and saying we can do better.Open full source frame
“Benchmaxxing is the exploitation of benchmark misalignment with human preference, but we can do better.”
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