AI Engineer World's Fair 2026

Through the AI Fog: The architectural decision the next 24 months of agentic security depends on.

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Through the AI Fog: The architectural decision the next 24 months of agentic security depends on.

Safe autonomous software needs independent validation of generated code, dependencies, tools, and behavior—not just a more capable model.

From a talk by Manoj Nair, Ezra Tanzer and Randall Degges

Before you start: Familiarity with coding agents, software dependencies, and vulnerability scanning will help; MCP is the protocol connecting an agent to external tools and data.

Safe autonomy starts with a trust question

How do you build software that operates safely at scale without a human in every loop? Removing the human checkpoint makes security more consequential: the system must have another way to determine whether its work is safe. Randall opens with that goal before introducing Manoj Nair, Snyk’s Chief Innovation Officer and CTO, whose previous roles span Commvault, HyperGrid, HPE, Dell, and RSA.

Nair grounds the discussion in enterprise deployments. He reports that Snyk serves roughly 5,000 enterprise customers, including half the Fortune 500. At the preceding World’s Fair, he recalls a gathering of 3,000 people where security felt absent; the subsequent AI Security Summit and dedicated track grew out of Snyk’s partnership with AI Engineer. The purpose is to make security part of building trusted systems without turning it into a brake on development.

Manoj Nair's opening slide states that security is fundamental to AI, with the speaker visible in an inset.Open full source frame
Security isn't a track at this conference by accident.

Generation and validation need separate responsibilities. Drawing on the preceding 18 months of work with enterprises and frontier labs, Nair asks whether the system producing software should also be trusted to certify it. The practical question is broader than whether the code looks correct: can you trust what an agent shipped, and how it shipped it? Three recurring customer problems organize the answer: automated attacks, untrusted agentic development, and ungoverned AI applications.

0:330:45
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Persistent attackers meet a larger attack surface

An automated attacker does not require the strongest available model. With useful context and a harness that lets it keep working, a less capable model can still search for exploitable combinations. That changes the meaning of a vulnerability backlog: fixing only critical and high-severity findings leaves lower-severity weaknesses that an attacker can chain together. Nair describes Mythos-class models as requiring less harness support, but his architectural point does not depend on access to them.

Adopting coding agents does not, by itself, resolve that asymmetry. Nair cites 1,000 enterprises spending more than $1 million on Claude Code rollouts, then asks what those deployments actually secure. He characterizes AI-generated code as worse than human-generated code while acknowledging that human code was never error-free. Beyond output quality, shared skills and MCP servers can introduce vulnerabilities or malware, and agent behavior can create exposure even when the original task is legitimate. Building business workflows around agents and models adds another application-level threat surface.

ProblemWhat changes
Automated attacksPersistent search can combine lower-severity weaknesses.
Untrusted agentic developmentCode, skills, tools, and agent actions all need scrutiny.
Ungoverned AI applicationsModels and agents become part of the application’s own attack surface.

These problems interact: the same development tools that accelerate delivery can introduce new components and behaviors for automated attackers to exploit.

Three columns describe automated AI attacks, untrusted agentic development, and ungoverned AI applications.Open full source frame
Three problems defining AI security: automated attacks, untrusted agentic development, and ungoverned applications.
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The backlog is growing while exploits compose

Across more than 4,800 customers observed over the preceding year, Nair reports 108% more vulnerability backlog quarter over quarter. The presentation does not supply the denominator or establish how much of that growth comes from AI-generated code. His operational concern is that enterprises already carry enormous inventories of vulnerabilities, yet those inventories continue growing despite agent adoption and remediation efforts.

Nair points to a LiteLLM exploit as an example of existing weaknesses chained across a new surface. The important property is composition: familiar vulnerabilities can acquire a larger blast radius when new tools, data access, and execution paths connect them. Speed makes this worse, but speed alone does not explain it.

He also cites a Five Eyes warning that AI could bypass cybersecurity systems within months rather than years. That is an attributed warning, not a measured deadline. The engineering response is to prepare for capabilities already appearing in attacks instead of treating a particular model release as the cure.

7:007:14
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The environment can be unsafe before code runs

Generated-code benchmarks cover only one part of the problem. Nair next turns to ToxicSkills, describing more than a third of studied skills as problematic and discussing skills used with OpenClaw, Claude, and Codex. That should not be read as saying a third contain malware: the published research distinguishes security issues from confirmed malicious payloads, and its sampled registries do not establish prevalence across every skill ecosystem. The underlying mechanism is that a few lines of natural-language instructions can direct powerful actions, so assessment must examine intent as well as conventional executable code.

MCP introduces a related trust problem by connecting agents to enterprise data and tools. Nair describes its security foundations as limited but improving and recalls a GitHub MCP incident after which some customers disabled all MCP servers—then reconsidered when developers objected. The relevant distinction is between a server code vulnerability and an agent misusing legitimate access: the published GitHub example involves malicious issue instructions inducing an agent to leak repository data. Safe enablement therefore requires attention to what the agent reads and what that content can cause it to do, not merely whether a server is allowed to connect.

Behavior creates exposure even without a malicious instruction. Nair describes agents in Snyk’s environment and Fortune 100 customer environments receiving PII while solving legitimate customer problems, then making an extra database copy for possible future use. The agent’s helpful intermediate step creates an untrusted data store outside established enterprise security coverage. Securing the requested output is insufficient if the route to that output creates new assets nobody knows to protect.

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Inventory the stack, then test the specific risk

Governance starts with discovering what exists. Across more than 3,000 customers, Nair reports finding roughly three times as many agentic components as models in repositories. Counting model integrations alone misses agents, tools, and the connections through which risk moves. Once those components are visible, their suitability still needs independent assessment.

Snyk’s RiskDB applies attacks and red teaming as models and components change. Nair’s example uses tests run during the preceding weekend on two unnamed frontier models and one unnamed recent open model. The model identities, versions, attack counts, and detailed conditions are not disclosed, so the percentages describe that attack set.

Tested outcomeTwo unnamed frontier modelsUnnamed open model
Successful PII extraction under Snyk’s attacks0% for each100%
Successful decision override under Snyk’s attacksWorse than the open model; rates not given0%

The ordering reverses with the task. A model that resists PII extraction can still be more susceptible to decision override. These results inform where to use a model and which controls it needs; they do not produce a single enduring ranking of model safety.

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A validator needs more than plausible findings

Independent validation also has to be repeatable. Nair introduces research released around the talk and describes the benchmark as fresh enough that models had not trained on it, while acknowledging that benchmarks need continual renewal. He says the tested systems include models not yet publicly available. Those are his descriptions of the evaluation; the useful engineering question is whether repeated scans return dependable evidence.

Nair summarizes the five-run result as roughly 50% of findings appearing across the tests; the slide specifies that nearly 50% of vulnerability reports appeared in only one of five identical scans. He then describes roughly 75% issue detection relative to a deterministic check and a 40% F1 score. The slide places the 40% F1 result on the largest application-like fixture.

The closely related VulnBench JS 1.0 publication makes the metric distinction consequential: its one-off reports concern findings unmatched to Snyk’s reference set, while reference-matched findings were more stable. Its best aggregate 75.4% result is F1, not recall, and the reference set measures agreement with Snyk Code rather than independently adjudicated accuracy. These distinctions prevent turning the spoken summary into a universal vulnerability-detection rate.

Independent validation does not mean an entirely deterministic implementation. Nair’s prescription is to combine methods: use dependable checks where they apply, and use LLMs to examine surfaces those checks cannot cover. The generator should not be the sole authority on whether its own output is secure, but probabilistic analysis still has a role inside a separately designed validation system.

Benchmark slide reports nearly 50% of vulnerability reports appearing in only one of five identical scans, a best score of 75.4% against Snyk Code's reference set, and 40% F1 in the largest app-like fixture.Open full source frame
The generator cannot be the validator.
12:0412:17
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Put security context where decisions happen

Prevention begins before an agent commits to a dependency or implementation. Nair describes Snyk Studio putting security context into the agentic loop: package health, known vulnerabilities, and malware information can steer dependency selection, while code analysis can catch patterns such as SQL injection. The control acts during construction, when the agent can still choose a different approach.

Existing backlogs require a different capability. An upgrade that removes a vulnerability but breaks the application is not a successful remediation. Nair calls this concern breakability: upgrade decisions need evidence about compatibility and application impact, not just a newer version number. He reports that Labelbox reached zero vulnerabilities and zero backlog. The linked Labelbox case study documents the narrower outcome of clearing its high-severity SAST backlog; it does not independently establish an organization-wide absence of vulnerabilities.

Nair also reports that an unnamed Magnificent Seven company remediated 16,000 critical issues with Snyk’s remediation agent during the preceding week. Prevention and remediation address different parts of the same inventory: one limits new debt, while the other reduces what has already accumulated.

The Agentic Development Security offering extends that coverage to the development environment, generated output, skills, MCP servers, and the behavior of coding agents such as Cursor, Claude, and Codex. Nair describes a general-availability launch the previous day; the published announcement labels behavior governance Open Preview, so availability should not be assumed identical across every capability. His broader requirement is operational: governance must discover repository changes, understand risk, and enforce policy inside active developer and agent workflows. A Confluence page or PDF cannot perform those actions.

13:2913:49
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Two packages can have no CVEs and still differ

Ezra’s first demonstration asks Claude to build a CLI that generates a QR-code image using an open-source dependency. The prompt explicitly requests Snyk’s package health check. In routine use, he recommends putting that requirement into a skill or hook so the check becomes an automatic part of the workflow rather than something a developer must remember to request.

The sequence is straightforward:

  1. Inspect the project and identify suitable dependencies.
  2. Request package-health information for the candidates.
  3. Use those results when choosing what to install.

Claude checks qrcode and qr-image. Conference Wi-Fi interrupts the live attempt, so Ezra switches to a recording using the same prompt. The displayed results come from that recorded run.

Signal in the demonstrationqrcodeqr-image
Active exploitable CVEs in checked versionsNone reportedNone reported
MaintenanceActiveInactive
Other contextWidely downloadedFirst released about a decade earlier

A CVE-only rule would not distinguish the candidates. A maintenance-aware rule would favor qrcode because someone is more likely to produce a patch when a future vulnerability appears.

A small JavaScript policy example makes that distinction explicit. These records encode only the signals discussed in the demo; allow is a proposed dependency decision, not an installation:

javascript

const candidates = [
  { name: 'qrcode', activeExploitableCves: 0, maintained: true },
  { name: 'qr-image', activeExploitableCves: 0, maintained: false },
];

function assessDependency(candidate) {
  if (candidate.activeExploitableCves > 0) {
    return { name: candidate.name, decision: 'block' };
  }
  return {
    name: candidate.name,
    decision: candidate.maintained ? 'allow' : 'review',
  };
}

console.table(candidates.map(assessDependency));

Ezra suggests that a maintained package is more likely to receive a patch within a day or two. That is his forecast, not a service guarantee. The durable selection criterion is future repairability alongside present vulnerability status.

15:3015:42
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An unchanged skill can acquire changed instructions

The second demonstration assesses a shared competitive-analysis skill and returns four findings. The first concrete problem is credential handling: the skill asks the agent to echo an authorization header. That can expose a secret through output or logs even if the surrounding task is legitimate.

The skill also pulls live content from Reddit and Twitter. For competitive analysis, that may be appropriate; the point is to know which external sources enter the workflow and whether their use fits the task. A more consequential dependency is an internet-hosted YAML file containing target-monitoring instructions and classification rules. That file supplies part of the logic the agent will follow.

The local skill file can remain unchanged while its effective instructions change. If the remote YAML changes, the next run can receive different rules without any local diff to review. The example below follows one constructed classification rule through that operation: the skill and input stay fixed, while the remote rule changes from retaining a summary locally to directing it to an external collector. This illustrates a possible instruction change, not an observed exfiltration in the demo.

Remote rules change without a local skill diff

Constructed example: Acme, the input wording, monitoring.yaml, field names, and both rule values are teaching examples. The source demonstrates the mutable remote-instruction mechanism, not this specific rule change or an executed transfer.

Competitive-analysis input — unchanged
Target: Acme. Summarize its public product announcements.

Operation: Replace a remote YAML rule, then resolve the unchanged skill's external instructions for the next run.

Local skill file

Before: Original remote instructions
Load remote monitoring.yaml and follow its classification rules.
After: Changed remote instructions, not executed · Unchanged
Load remote monitoring.yaml and follow its classification rules.

Task input

Before: Original remote instructions
Target: Acme. Summarize its public product announcements.
After: Changed remote instructions, not executed · Unchanged
Target: Acme. Summarize its public product announcements.

Remote YAML rule

Before: Original remote instructions
classification: product-announcement
summary_action: retain-locally
After: Changed remote instructions, not executed · Changed
classification: product-announcement
summary_action: send-to-external-collector
Reviewing only the local file misses changes to instructions loaded at runtime.

Ezra describes ongoing work to improve the findings’ signal-to-noise ratio and expose policy configuration in Evo. He presents corresponding improvements to the open-source tool as future work. Assessment therefore has two responsibilities: detect dangerous behavior, and distinguish it from legitimate external data use so that useful skills remain usable.

18:5519:05
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From individual checks to a learning system

The closing moves from specialized agents to the system coordinating them. Nair describes Evo as a concept introduced late in the preceding year, with individual security agents built out since then. Its organizing analogy comes from fighter-pilot training: observe, orient, decide, act, then learn from the result. Finding an asset, interpreting its risk, choosing a response, and acting are connected responsibilities rather than isolated scans.

The intended operator is an AI security engineer equipped to work at the pace of AI-assisted development. Nair points to the preceding day’s workshop, which he says trained hundreds of AI security engineers, but acknowledges unfinished work in multi-agent coordination, harnesses, and shared memory. Those are system problems that additional specialized agents do not automatically solve.

Evo’s proposed direction is an open, community-built system developed with industry partners. The aspiration is to give security engineers the same order-of-magnitude increase in capability that AI tools promise developers. Independent validation is the architectural foundation for that goal: generation can accelerate while a separate security system observes what happened, decides whether it is acceptable, and helps correct it.

21:0321:21
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Resources

From the talk

  • Snyk VulnBench JS 1.0Article

    Repeated JavaScript security scans distinguish inconsistent extra findings from stable matches to a Snyk Code reference set.

  • Toxic Flow AnalysisArticle

    Explains how combinations of untrusted instructions, sensitive data, and tool access enable exfiltration.

  • Public security scanner for AI agents, MCP servers, and agent skills.

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