Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production — Averi Kitsch & Prerna Kakkar, Google
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Build-Time vs. Run-Time: Why Dev Tools Fail in Production
Averi Kitsch and Prerna Kakkar show why flexible database tools become dangerous when exposed to end users—and how predefined SQL, restricted privileges, and application-bound identity turn an agent tool into a production interface.
From a talk by Averi Kitsch and Prerna Kakkar
At a glance
Ideas worth remembering
Keep control-plane and arbitrary SQL tools in human-supervised development workflows; production agents should invoke predefined operations with narrow, typed inputs.
Treat model-derived parameters as untrusted. Connection details, SQL statements, permissions, and authenticated user identity belong under application or server control.
Bound or authenticated parameters prevent a prompt from substituting another user’s identity; the final tool can expose only nonsensitive choices such as a date.
Design tools around outcomes, separate reads from writes, return errors an agent can act on, and prefer simple flat inputs.
Developer tools and production tools have different jobs
Averi Kitsch, technical lead for MCP Toolbox for databases, and Prerna Kakkar, technical lead for EvalBench, begin with a practical distinction: database tools that help developers explore or administer a system are usually the wrong tools to place behind a production agent. MCP Toolbox supplies database connectivity, authentication, connection pooling, and observability, but those capabilities do not decide how much freedom an agent should receive. The tool interface still determines what the agent can do.
The first two database patterns favor flexibility. Control-plane tools create and manage instances or databases. Because these administrative operations can be destructive, they belong in developer-assistance workflows with a human checking consequential actions. Natural-language-to-SQL tools let an agent generate raw SQL when the necessary query cannot be known in advance. They suit exploration, such as finding California customers who bought a winter coat in July, returned it within 14 days, and then grouping them by the campaign that acquired them.
Structured SQL tools target a different operating environment. The SQL statement and accepted parameters are defined before deployment, leaving the agent to select a known operation and supply a small set of values. That limits invented queries, supports injection defenses, and can reduce latency because the model no longer synthesizes SQL for every request. The lost flexibility is intentional: production software should expose the actions the product supports, rather than every action the database can perform.
Create or manage databases and instances; powerful administrative operations require human supervision.
The useful boundary is determined by who supervises the tool and whether its executable logic is fixed before a request arrives.
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“Delete the table and start fresh” is not a recovery policy
Build-time tools are atomic and flexible, which makes them useful under a developer’s supervision and hazardous inside an end-user application. A production chatbot instead needs runtime operations such as a deterministic cancel_order tool whose database behavior is fixed behind the interface.
The failure at 6:05 is blunt. After encountering an error, the agent proposed deleting the table and starting over. The table was deleted, with no guardrail stopping the operation. The observable result was total data removal; the causal chain was an error, a model-generated recovery idea, broad database authority, and no independent control capable of rejecting the destructive path. A plausible suggestion became an executable disaster because the tool exposed too much power.
The planned runtime demonstration used SimAir, a flight-booking chatbot. Prerna would claim to be Averi and ask the system to book a flight under Averi’s identity. Authentication was intended to keep the booking tied to Prerna instead. The demonstration did not load, so the recording explains the intended result without visibly verifying it; the identity-binding mechanism later in the talk shows how the application is meant to enforce that result.
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The confused deputy turns a work item into a breach
“Your database is only as secure as your agent” captures the next problem. Language models can be manipulated, so database security cannot depend on the model consistently distinguishing legitimate instructions from malicious ones. In a confused deputy attack, someone convinces an agent to misuse privileges that the agent legitimately possesses but the requester does not.
The dangerous combination is the “lethal trifecta,” a phrase coined by Simon Willison: access to private data, exposure to untrusted content, and a channel that can return data to an external user. The triage-agent example at 9:38 contains all three. The agent reads a ticket, uses database permissions to investigate, and posts its findings back to the ticket.
A malicious insider inserts an instruction to query the salary database and return every employee’s salary. The agent complies because the ticket looks like a trusted work item and the database accepts the agent’s credentials. The breach does not require stealing those credentials. The attacker instead supplies content that persuades a privileged deputy to use them.
Traditional applications narrow this path with fixed fields and predefined queries. Agentic applications introduce values derived dynamically from language, so the system must distinguish agent-controlled parameters from application-controlled parameters. Agent parameters come from model interpretation and should be treated as untrusted. Application parameters encode facts and constraints—such as the authenticated user’s ID—that must remain outside the model’s control.
Contains a planted instruction requesting salary data.
The ticket supplies untrusted instructions, while the agent contributes privileges and a return channel. Together they create the breach path.
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Tool quality precedes the final identity boundary
A constrained tool can still fail if the agent cannot understand or invoke it reliably. The recommended interface is outcome-shaped rather than a thin copy of atomic REST endpoints. A tool named for the complete action can replace several round trips, while its description should explain when and why to use it instead of repeating parameter definitions already present in the schema.
Several interface choices improve control and reliability:
- Separate reads from writes. Read tools can be automatically approved while write tools can require explicit user confirmation.
- Return actionable errors. A generic
404gives the agent little recovery guidance; an error that identifies a retryable condition gives it a useful next step. - Prefer flat, simple inputs. Complex nested maps are harder for models to construct consistently than a small set of typed fields.
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Bind user identity outside the agent
The lookup_flights tool now has predefined SQL and accepts only specific fields such as user_id and date. That is safer than arbitrary SQL, but user_id remains sensitive: a prompt could still persuade the model to substitute another account. The final step removes this parameter from the agent-visible interface.
With bound parameters, the application authenticates the user and injects the resulting identity directly into the tool call without showing it to the agent. With authenticated parameters, the tool receives an OpenID-signed JWT, validates the token, and extracts claims such as user ID, email, and issuer. Both mechanisms make conversation text unable to select the account under which the query runs.
What changed from the original superuser tool to the final lookup at 19:08? The diagram follows the shrinking control surface. Connection details move into server configuration; driver restrictions and, where supported, allowed datasets limit the blast radius; custom tools replace generated SQL; and authenticated application state supplies the user identity. The agent is left with a nonsensitive choice such as the date.
The resulting design is described as a zero-trust architecture because meaningful privileges and factual constraints are not granted merely because the model appears cooperative. That label does not make the complete system automatically safe; it describes where enforcement occurs. The model proposes a date, while components outside the model determine the connection, permitted operation, reachable data, output size, and authenticated user.
The closing reminder is operational: tool behavior must be evaluated, not merely declared secure. EvalBench is highlighted as the framework used to check whether agentic tools work well. The recording does not provide evaluation results, but the dependency is clear: SQL and identity guardrails define permitted behavior, while evaluations test whether agents select and use those constrained tools successfully.
The agent controls credentials, connection details, and raw SQL.
Each stage removes another consequential decision from the model and places it under deterministic application or server control.
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Resources
Further reading
A practical introduction to MCP Toolbox for Databases, its supported databases, and database-aware development workflows. It provides useful context for the flexible build-time tools that this talk says should remain human-supervised.
Related talks
- How to Secure Agents using OAuth
A related talk on OAuth and agent security for readers interested in the identity discussion.
- CIAM for AI: Authn/Authz for Agents — Michael Grinich, CEO of WorkOS
A related talk focused on authentication and authorization for agents.
- Building Protected MCP Servers
A related talk on protecting MCP servers, complementing the database-tool security discussion.
Read the complete timestamped transcript
- 0:01
[music]
- 0:12
Hey everyone, how all of you are doing
- 0:15
today?
- 0:17
Yeah. Uh so nice to meet you everyone.
- 0:20
Uh today uh I and my friend Avery are
- 0:24
going to talk about build time versus
- 0:25
runtime. Why your developer tools fail
- 0:28
in production.
- 0:30
So firstly, know about us.
- 0:33
>> Hi everybody. I'm Avery Kit and I'm a
- 0:36
staff software engineer working on
- 0:37
Google Cloud databases. I'm currently
- 0:40
the technical lead for MCP toolbox for
- 0:42
databases, our open-source uh database
- 0:45
MCP server and our Google Cloud MCP
- 0:48
server um maintainer.
- 0:51
Hi, I'm Pna and I am currently working
- 0:53
as senior software engineer at Google
- 0:56
and I am currently tech lead for Eval
- 0:59
bench which is the evaluation framework
- 1:01
for all your agent tech MCP and skills
- 1:03
need and I'm also an active contributor
- 1:06
to MCP toolbox.
- 1:09
So today we are going to cover three
- 1:11
areas broadly. We will firstly start
- 1:13
with the history of MCP at Google. Then
- 1:17
we will cover on the common tool
- 1:18
patterns that we have found from our own
- 1:21
work and practices and how did we use
- 1:24
all those practices to build some tools
- 1:26
for database access and how you can use
- 1:28
them and then lastly we will talk about
- 1:31
security guard rails how you can stop
- 1:34
data leaks using identity aware
- 1:36
guardrails.
- 1:38
So let's get to know the background
- 1:41
quickly. Um I'll talk about MCB toolbox
- 1:44
for database. It's an open-source
- 1:47
self-managed uh serving that we provide.
- 1:50
Uh it has currently about 15.7K GitHub
- 1:54
stars. We have 132 plus active
- 1:56
contributors across 40 plus different
- 1:58
databases. It's highly customizable
- 2:01
framework and basically we provide you
- 2:04
with connection pooling integrated O and
- 2:07
you don't even need to care about the
- 2:08
observability. You will get all of them
- 2:10
out of the box.
- 2:12
Then if you don't want to do a
- 2:14
self-managed one but you want to have a
- 2:17
hosted scaled version, we provide
- 2:20
something as Google managed MCP. It's
- 2:23
fully managed. Uh you can plug it across
- 2:26
various agents and ids or harnesses like
- 2:29
Gemini CLI, anti-gravity CLI, cloud
- 2:32
code, you name any. uh it's co uh it's
- 2:36
governed and the discovery is simple and
- 2:39
we also provide model armor which
- 2:42
provides secure access management and
- 2:44
identity control. So combined with uh
- 2:48
the managed version of MCP and the MCP
- 2:51
toolbox last month we had 20 million
- 2:53
tool calls.
- 2:56
Um some of the common tool patterns that
- 2:59
we have observed specifically for
- 3:00
databases. So I'm going to quickly talk
- 3:02
about them.
- 3:04
Firstly uh is the control plane tools.
- 3:07
What we like to call them is admin tools
- 3:09
or manage tools. It is basically in
- 3:12
developer assistance space. So it will
- 3:14
help you create like instance, manage
- 3:17
your instance, create your databases,
- 3:20
manage your databases. It will help you
- 3:22
with all your DBA needs. But you need to
- 3:25
be very careful. You need to be you need
- 3:28
to have a human in the loop because we
- 3:30
don't want to carry out any dangerous
- 3:32
activities.
- 3:34
Um so these tools are built on already
- 3:37
provisioned public API so you get
- 3:39
monitoring and other things out of the
- 3:41
box.
- 3:44
Next one is natural language to SQL or
- 3:46
NL2SQL tools. So basically we are
- 3:49
relying on a tool called as execute SQL
- 3:52
and with the help of agent we generate
- 3:54
raw SQL queries. So you can use this
- 3:57
cases where you don't know uh what
- 3:59
queries you would require beforehand. So
- 4:01
you will get all these queries out of
- 4:04
the out of the box. So it it focuses on
- 4:08
the developer assistance and analytical
- 4:10
agents and uh you can use it for
- 4:12
flexible explorations. So for example,
- 4:15
we have one of the examples like find
- 4:17
all customers in California who bought a
- 4:20
winter coat in July and returned it
- 4:22
within 14 days and group them by the
- 4:25
marketing campaign that originally
- 4:28
acquired them. So this is one of the
- 4:30
queries where uh you can use this tool
- 4:32
uh to get your answers.
- 4:37
But then we have something called a
- 4:39
structure SQL tools which is getting
- 4:41
quite popular and this targets mainly
- 4:43
the production use cases where you know
- 4:46
like what SQL query you want to use and
- 4:48
you want to have security built in and
- 4:51
uh you the parameters are already
- 4:54
configured so uh you prevent SQL
- 4:56
injection
- 4:58
and ensure highly controlled access by
- 5:00
restricting agent to predefined logic.
- 5:03
It also helps you with your latency
- 5:05
needs and reduce the hallucination on
- 5:07
the agent side.
- 5:10
Now we come to the main topic I guess
- 5:13
for which you guys are here for
- 5:15
buildtime versus runtime. So buildtime
- 5:17
are the developer assistant use cases.
- 5:20
Um you can think about the initial two
- 5:22
cases that we presented to you like the
- 5:24
NL2SQL tools and the control plane
- 5:26
tools. They come into the category of
- 5:28
buildtime tools. uh it's atomic and f
- 5:31
flexible but again you don't want to
- 5:33
delete your databases so it requires to
- 5:36
be a human in the loop case and you
- 5:38
can't run them on the on production use
- 5:40
cases but let's say I'm interested in
- 5:43
building some chat B and I want to do
- 5:45
production use cases there you rely on
- 5:48
runtime or end user applications you can
- 5:51
build those using patenting AI or lchain
- 5:54
um so you can see one of the examples
- 5:56
like we have a cancel order a
- 5:57
deterministic structure SQL query that
- 6:00
we have given and you can use it as a
- 6:02
tool.
- 6:05
This is one of the examples uh or demo
- 6:07
for like wherein a buildtime tool was
- 6:11
used and uh you can see the error
- 6:13
message. So uh agent actually asked to
- 6:16
delete the table and start fresh. We
- 6:18
deleted everything and there were no
- 6:20
safeguard or guardrails here.
- 6:24
Now let's go to our demo for
- 6:27
runtime tools.
- 6:38
Yeah, maybe um I think until the video
- 6:41
loads. So, so sorry for the technical
- 6:44
glitch that we have, but I can quickly
- 6:46
walk you through what we are going to
- 6:47
present in the video and I guess it's
- 6:49
loading. Yeah.
- 6:52
Um so this demo is particularly talking
- 6:55
about how did we use our production
- 6:57
tools in a chatbot. Uh and we created a
- 7:02
demo called a Similar and Symbolair is
- 7:05
going to help me with booking all my
- 7:07
flights in San Francisco and do and
- 7:10
whatever I would require to do in San
- 7:12
San Francisco it would basically help me
- 7:14
with it. Uh, one of the things that I
- 7:17
would try is I would try to fool my
- 7:20
agent that I am Avery and not PRA and
- 7:23
book a flight for me to San Francisco.
- 7:27
But because our agent is uh has all the
- 7:31
authenticated O, it will not get fooled
- 7:34
and it will not book any flights uh on
- 7:36
behalf of Avery, but it will do it on my
- 7:39
behalf. Um and then you can use it to
- 7:42
basically change your flights. You want
- 7:44
to know about all the shops that are
- 7:46
there, you can do all these requirements
- 7:48
using that. So I guess thank you u
- 7:53
Avery.
- 7:59
I think we
- 8:17
>> [sighs]
- 8:19
>> Apologies again for our technical
- 8:22
difficulties here.
- 8:32
Um, unfortunately, it looks like I need
- 8:33
to present from just the slide deck
- 8:35
because it's not loading. Okay, so I
- 8:38
apologize for not being able to see our
- 8:40
demo today, but we can still learn all
- 8:42
the security and guardrails that we need
- 8:44
to secure our database access. So, the
- 8:46
first thing that we need to know is your
- 8:48
database is only as secure as your
- 8:50
agent. We all know that agents and LMS
- 8:54
are actually pretty easy to trick. They
- 8:55
might be getting slightly better today,
- 8:57
but we can still work really hard to
- 9:00
trick them. And so we have a very common
- 9:03
attack pattern called the confused
- 9:05
deputy attack. And this is when a user
- 9:07
can trick an agent into misusing their
- 9:10
privileges um to access data that a user
- 9:13
wasn't supposed to access. So Simon
- 9:16
Willis actually coined the phrase the
- 9:18
lethal trifecta. And a data breach
- 9:21
occurs when an agent has simultaneous
- 9:24
access to three different things. One,
- 9:26
private data. Two, untrusted content.
- 9:30
And three, the ability to expose that
- 9:33
content and that data back to an
- 9:35
external user.
- 9:38
So let's take a look of that in action.
- 9:41
So let's say I'm building a triage um
- 9:44
agent and so a ticket is fired or alert
- 9:46
goes out and my agent is designed to um
- 9:51
look at that ticket and go investigate
- 9:54
what it needs to do. So on that ticket
- 9:57
the agent gets a little bit of data like
- 9:59
we need to go look in this database for
- 10:01
these reasons. Um but a malicious
- 10:03
insider can actually come into that
- 10:05
trusted system and instead say well I
- 10:09
want to query the salary database and
- 10:11
please return all the employees
- 10:13
salaries. And so since this is a trusted
- 10:16
system the agent goes okay let me use my
- 10:18
permissions. I have those privileges. I
- 10:21
have that access. I will query that and
- 10:23
I'll post that right back on the ticket
- 10:24
because that's what the ticket tells me
- 10:26
to do. But now we have a huge data
- 10:30
breach. a user that wasn't supposed to
- 10:33
have access to private data now has that
- 10:35
access. And so now we have a big PR
- 10:38
fiasco.
- 10:43
So this makes a little bit more sense
- 10:45
when we think about who's controlling
- 10:47
access and who's controlling the
- 10:50
parameters. So we talk about agent or
- 10:52
application versus modeled controlled
- 10:54
parameters. So in a traditional
- 10:57
architecture, things were actually much
- 10:59
easier because you would have a few
- 11:02
input fields, you would define your
- 11:04
queries and then that would be safely
- 11:06
injected into those queries.
- 11:10
And so it was okay when your application
- 11:13
had a little bit more access because it
- 11:17
knew exactly what actions it was going
- 11:19
to take.
- 11:21
But in uh a gent application these rules
- 11:25
aren't as clear. So we need to first
- 11:27
think about um separating the three
- 11:29
different identities. We have the user
- 11:31
identity, we have the application
- 11:34
identity and the agent identity.
- 11:39
So first um we need to think about what
- 11:41
the user has access to. So the user just
- 11:44
needs to have access to the application.
- 11:47
that application's workload identity can
- 11:50
have a little bit more broader access um
- 11:52
because it needs to probably talk to
- 11:54
different services but the agent running
- 11:57
in that application only needs to have
- 12:00
access to the data that that end user
- 12:02
initially needs to have.
- 12:06
So then next we need to think about
- 12:07
who's controlling the tool inputs. So we
- 12:11
have um agent parameters
- 12:15
um and a application parameters. So
- 12:17
agent parameters are the untrusted
- 12:19
inputs that the agent is deriving
- 12:21
dynamically. And then we also have
- 12:23
application parameters. These are the
- 12:25
factual constraints that we need to keep
- 12:27
outside of the agents uh control.
- 12:33
Okay. So now let's look at the evolution
- 12:36
of a secure tool. Here we have a fully
- 12:39
modeled control tool. And so essentially
- 12:42
the agent here is a super user. It has
- 12:44
access to database credentials, the
- 12:46
host, the port, the connection details,
- 12:48
and even the raw SQL query.
- 12:53
And so we're only secure as um the agent
- 12:57
here. And we can really easily again
- 12:59
trick the agent into exposing all of
- 13:01
this data. And now we have access to
- 13:03
essentially any database in the system.
- 13:08
So Toolbox solves for this um by
- 13:10
introducing a source primitive.
- 13:13
So we move the connection details out of
- 13:15
the agents control and in toolbox um a
- 13:18
user will preconfigure the connection
- 13:20
details in a YAML file and then when we
- 13:22
start our MCP server those are safely
- 13:24
injected and so we do not have to have
- 13:27
the agent um to have access to that.
- 13:33
So we can add a little bit more control
- 13:35
to our um source security as well. Our
- 13:38
number one request that we get from
- 13:39
customers is read only restrictions. We
- 13:42
want to be able to remove all right
- 13:44
ability from agents if we need that
- 13:46
specific uh user journey. So this means
- 13:49
removing right tools but also down to
- 13:52
the database driver ensuring that we can
- 13:54
only do read only queries.
- 13:58
If we're also concerned about again
- 14:00
blast radius um and securing all of our
- 14:03
tables and our databases um some of our
- 14:05
cloudnative databases have this concept
- 14:08
of allowed data sets. So again we can
- 14:10
add that like enum to our source in
- 14:12
order to continue to restrict um the
- 14:14
blast radius of um the agents control
- 14:17
and lastly is output size. You might not
- 14:19
actually think that this is a security
- 14:22
layer, but if again the agent gets into
- 14:25
the wrong hands, we can reduce that
- 14:27
blast radius by saying uh the agent can
- 14:30
only uh grab this much data. So we're
- 14:31
not overwhelming both our agent or our
- 14:34
database.
- 14:38
So sweet, we have our configurable
- 14:40
sources tool. So you can see here that
- 14:42
actually now our tool input, our tool
- 14:45
signature is very minimalized. we only
- 14:47
have the SQL string that's um being
- 14:50
generated by the agent.
- 14:55
But this comes to our actual our next
- 14:56
pro problem. We want to be able to
- 14:59
control what the agent is running. We
- 15:02
don't want the agent to have the ability
- 15:04
to generate any SQL um that it can think
- 15:06
of. So toolbox introduces custom tools
- 15:10
and again in our YAML file we can define
- 15:12
the exact SQL uh statement that will run
- 15:16
very reliable.
- 15:18
It's a reliable and secure uh SQL query.
- 15:22
Um this also allows us to customize the
- 15:24
tool name and the tool description.
- 15:26
These are really important for the agent
- 15:28
to have the context on how to use this
- 15:30
tool um accurately.
- 15:34
And in the system we use prepared
- 15:35
statements with type parameters in order
- 15:37
to reduce um SQL injection attacks. So
- 15:40
we make sure that everything is um
- 15:44
we validate all the input types um when
- 15:46
we inject that into the SQL for the
- 15:48
user.
- 15:52
Okay, let's dive into a little bit more
- 15:53
of best practices for tool quality. So
- 15:56
we really highly recommend that tools
- 15:58
focus on outcomes. We really shouldn't
- 16:00
be thinking in atomic rest APIs. we
- 16:03
should think about what the action
- 16:05
actually needs to do. This also reduces
- 16:07
the round trip of needing to make
- 16:10
multiple tool calls. And again, the
- 16:13
descriptions are guidance. We shouldn't
- 16:15
um duplicate information like input
- 16:17
parameters because the agent already has
- 16:19
access to that. So, writing really good
- 16:22
um tool descriptions is very important
- 16:24
for accurate tool usage.
- 16:27
We also recommend that you separate read
- 16:29
versus write tools. Um by doing this you
- 16:32
can automatically approve read tools and
- 16:35
but you can also then send write tools
- 16:37
uh to the user for um confirmation and
- 16:40
this just makes it very much more clear
- 16:42
for the agent to use these
- 16:44
and this is actually uh the next is
- 16:46
actionable errors. This is the number
- 16:48
one thing that I think we can all do
- 16:50
better. So usually we just return like a
- 16:52
generic HTTP error four or four but we
- 16:56
all know agents are actually really
- 16:57
smart now and so if you give the ability
- 17:00
to have an error of that can be
- 17:02
retrieded the agent can actually take
- 17:04
that action. So being able to return a
- 17:07
error is really important and lastly is
- 17:11
simple inputs. We see that people try to
- 17:13
use these complex maps uh complex
- 17:16
primitives to um that an agent needs to
- 17:19
be able to build and that is not
- 17:21
reliable. Using flat structure with um
- 17:26
with uh simple inputs will really
- 17:28
increase your reliability.
- 17:32
So sweet. Now we're at custom semantic
- 17:35
tools. You can see that we now have our
- 17:37
lookup flights tool that takes in the
- 17:39
dynamic parameters such as user ID and
- 17:42
date. And so now our we're very much
- 17:45
more secure because the agent isn't
- 17:47
generating that SQL query. It doesn't
- 17:49
have the ability to kind of go off the
- 17:51
rails. It only is looking at these very
- 17:53
specific inputs.
- 17:57
But user ID is actually a very sensitive
- 18:00
piece of information. It is PII. we need
- 18:02
to also remove that from the ability of
- 18:05
the agent's control. So we can do this
- 18:07
in two different ways. We have bounded
- 18:10
parameters. This is when the application
- 18:12
first um authenticates the user and then
- 18:15
we can bind that parameter um directly
- 18:17
to our tool. And so that restricts the
- 18:20
agents control of it. It actually never
- 18:21
sees that user identity.
- 18:24
But toolbox also solves for this in
- 18:27
another way called authenticated
- 18:28
parameters. This is when we tell the
- 18:31
tool that you're going to receive a
- 18:34
identity token, an open ID, a signed jot
- 18:36
token, and when we call that tool that
- 18:40
we want it first to validate that token.
- 18:42
Is that token real? Is that token
- 18:44
correct? And then we'll extract the user
- 18:46
claims from that token for the user. And
- 18:49
so the claims usually include like a
- 18:51
user ID, an email, um an issuer.
- 18:55
And so it's secured because we're again
- 18:58
extracting that user identity out of the
- 19:01
agents control and binding that to the
- 19:03
tool.
- 19:08
So now um we're have a much more secure
- 19:13
tool. We have our lookup flights tool
- 19:15
that only takes in a very easy parameter
- 19:18
such as date. It doesn't have to handle
- 19:21
any sensitive information such as PII,
- 19:23
user identity. And so we're really here
- 19:26
now at um our zero trust architecture
- 19:30
where we're in full control of
- 19:32
everything that we need to be in control
- 19:34
of.
- 19:39
So thank you all for coming to listen to
- 19:41
our talk today. Again, I apologize for
- 19:43
our technical difficulties. Uh we highly
- 19:46
recommend if you want to learn more
- 19:47
about our technologies um that you look
- 19:50
at our documentation and our uh GitHub
- 19:52
repository. I also really want to
- 19:54
highlight our eval bench repository
- 19:56
because this is how we know that our
- 19:58
tools are working well and eval.
- 20:03
So thank you all for joining us today.
- 20:07
[applause]