AI Engineer World's Fair 2026

Teaching AI to Find Real Vulnerabilities — Prof. David Brumley, Bugcrowd

David Brumley· Chief AI and Science Officer, Bugcrowd27:17

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Teaching AI to Find Real Vulnerabilities

Cybersecurity reinforcement learning needs more than a crash reward: it needs reproducible targets, executable proof, and graders that recognize distinct discoveries and deeper exploitation skills.

From a talk by David Brumley

Before you start: Familiarity with language-model tool use, reinforcement learning rewards, and basic memory-safety concepts will help; the article explains the vulnerability-grading and sandbox distinctions.

A curriculum built from problems

Software is being produced faster than people can inspect it. How do we teach machines to check it at comparable speed and scale? David Brumley, who introduces himself as a Carnegie Mellon professor and Bugcrowd’s Chief AI and Science Officer, starts with how a person learned to hack. In his account, picoCTF attracts about a million high-school participants annually. In 2016, an unfamiliar competitor began climbing its scoreboard alongside students from schools that regularly dominated the competition.

The competitor had moved from math competitions into cybersecurity. Brumley recounts that he finished second by following a simple loop: inspect the task, search for the missing knowledge, read explanations and write-ups, then emulate what worked. After recruiting him to CMU, Brumley encouraged the same process across increasingly difficult problems. The progression mattered as much as access to information: an easy task gave the student something concrete to practice before attempting a harder one.

Brumley identifies the student as Richard Zhu and describes a progression from beginner to Pwn2Own winner in two years. He associates that success with the first Tesla hack at the competition, $375,000 in cash, and a new Tesla. His other examples include George Hotz, associated with the first iPhone jailbreak, and Pwn2Own winner SungHyun Lee. The curriculum he wants for AI follows the same pattern: acquire a skill, demonstrate it on a tractable problem, and move to a harder target.

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Target difficulty and exploitation difficulty

A cybersecurity curriculum has two independent axes. Target difficulty runs from toy programs through CTF and synthetic challenges to ordinary open-source software and hardened systems. Exploitation difficulty measures what the agent can do with a flaw: locate it, trigger an observable fault, obtain arbitrary memory reads and writes, or achieve arbitrary code execution. A crash in a difficult program and code execution in a toy program represent different accomplishments.

The same structure applies to frontier models and privately tuned models. Tasks should become harder along the target axis while teaching specific capabilities along the exploitation axis. This avoids treating every successful interaction with a vulnerable program as equivalent.

Diagram with target categories Toy, CTF/Synthetic, Average OSS, and Hardened along the horizontal axis. The vertical exploit difficulty axis shows trigger, crash, read/write memory, and arbitrary code execution.Open full source frame
Target difficulty and exploit difficulty form two separate axes.

Cybersecurity fits reinforcement learning because many rungs have an observable success condition—an oracle that can determine whether the agent achieved the task. The first design problem is making that oracle correct for vulnerability discovery. The next is measuring weaponization: whether a discovered flaw can become a working exploit against a hardened target. Brumley uses what someone would pay for an exploit as an intuitive measure of its value, then asks whether models can reach the capabilities that make those exploits valuable.

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Make success executable

The reward objective determines what the model learns. Start with a vulnerable application inside a reproducible container: differences between operating-system versions can otherwise change program behavior and invalidate comparisons. Pair that application with a deterministic grading oracle. Brumley reports that models readily claim hacking success without demonstrating it, which makes an LLM judge a poor substitute for checking the actual outcome. For a discovery task, that outcome might initially be a reproducible crash.

The gym’s interaction contract is small:

  1. The LLM’s orchestrator connects to an MCP interface and calls setup.
  2. Setup returns the problem definition; sandboxed tools let the agent read and write inside the container.
  3. The agent submits an artifact to a final grading oracle.

Before exposing this environment, its designer has reproduced at least one flaw, perhaps from a bug report or a manually confirmed crash. That establishes that the initial exercise is solvable without requiring the prompt to reveal the solution.

The requested artifact is a proof of vulnerability, or PoV. Merely naming a suspicious function cannot distinguish a correct discovery from a hallucination; an input that makes the program misbehave can. In the toy example, a sufficiently long sequence of A characters triggers a crash. The agent supplies that input, the oracle runs it against the program, and the observed result determines the reward.

The oracle must match the rung being taught. A CTF may check whether the agent captured a flag. A discovery exercise may check for a crash. A control-flow exercise needs stronger evidence, such as causing the target to launch a calculator or another external program it should not be able to run. Brumley also names a reverse shell as such a demonstration. These are different grading contracts, not interchangeable definitions of hacking.

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The easiest bug can consume the reward

Brumley introduces the limitations of this setup through existing benchmarks, including Cybench and CyberGym. The central problem is an assumption that the program contains one relevant vulnerability. Real programs can contain several, including flaws unknown to the evaluator. If every crash receives the same reward, the model can repeatedly find the easiest flaw without learning to investigate the others. If it finds an unexpected but valid flaw, a grader built around one intended answer may not know how to credit it.

Two tempting fixes pull in opposite directions:

  • Tell the agent which bug to find. A backtrace that identifies the vulnerable function removes much of the localization problem. The relevant function may fit entirely in the context window, turning a program-level investigation into a much narrower task.
  • Accept any crash. The agent retains freedom to explore, but it can earn reward by rediscovering the same easy flaw.

Brumley attributes backtrace guidance to existing benchmarks; the general leakage problem does not depend on every benchmark using that exact contract. Cybench’s published description is of CTF tasks with optional subtask guidance, rather than a universal backtrace-based prompt.

Hand-curating a program does not guarantee that it has only the intended bug. Brumley’s team won DARPA’s Cyber Grand Challenge, and he reports that 50% of its hand-curated challenges contained unknown vulnerabilities despite a contest-design investment he puts at $60 million. He also cites a further 50% exploitation figure without clearly identifying its denominator. In the later AI Cyber Challenge, whose scoring algorithm he says he designed, 18 unintended vulnerabilities were found; DARPA identifies these as real, non-synthetic findings in the 2025 final competition. The practical lesson is to design for additional bugs rather than assume curation has eliminated them.

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Audit the program, not one known flaw

The audit task changes the request from finding one bug to finding the vulnerabilities in the program. The agent can submit multiple PoVs, covering both known and previously unknown flaws. The oracle runs each witness and then determines which successful witnesses correspond to distinct vulnerabilities. Two crashing inputs are not automatically two discoveries: they may trigger the same underlying bug.

A validated new discovery can expand the reference set. Brumley calls the normalized set D*: it includes the vulnerabilities already known to the evaluator and additional discoveries established through submitted evidence. This makes the grader open to a correct answer that was not in its original answer key.

Precision and recall balance the incentives:

MeasureQuestion it answers
RecallHow much of the normalized vulnerability set did the model find?
PrecisionHow many submissions establish valid discoveries?

Recall rewards broader coverage. Precision penalizes submissions such as a PoV that triggers nothing. Deduplication is necessary before treating successful witnesses as distinct discoveries. Brumley describes normalized precision and recall as multiplicative, but does not specify a complete reward formula. The mechanism is to reward additional validated bugs while preventing a flood of unsupported claims from looking productive.

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The grader must recognize distinct discoveries

Open-world grading adds a concrete engineering responsibility: identifying when multiple PoVs expose the same bug. Brumley’s implementation groups findings using stack backtraces, drawing an analogy to the crash reports that Microsoft and Apple collect and triage. Backtraces belong inside the grader here; they need not be supplied to the agent as hints.

The bookkeeping can be expressed in JavaScript once the oracle has replayed each witness and assigned a bug identity. In this small example, two submissions map to bug-a, a third establishes bug-b, and a fourth fails validation:

javascript

const knownBugs = new Set(["bug-a"]);
const gradedSubmissions = [
  { povId: "pov-1", bugId: "bug-a" },
  { povId: "pov-2", bugId: "bug-a" },
  { povId: "pov-3", bugId: "bug-b" },
  { povId: "pov-4", bugId: null },
];

const witnessesByBug = new Map();
const invalidSubmissions = [];

for (const { povId, bugId } of gradedSubmissions) {
  if (bugId === null) {
    invalidSubmissions.push(povId);
    continue;
  }
  const witnesses = witnessesByBug.get(bugId) ?? [];
  witnesses.push(povId);
  witnessesByBug.set(bugId, witnesses);
}

const normalizedReference = new Set([
  ...knownBugs,
  ...witnessesByBug.keys(),
]);

console.log({
  discoveries: [...witnessesByBug.keys()],
  reference: [...normalizedReference],
  invalidSubmissions,
});

The grouping preserves both witnesses for bug-a without counting them as separate discoveries. The difficult security work happens before this bookkeeping: reproducing the behavior and assigning reliable bug identities. A distinct stack signature is useful triage evidence, not a substitute for designing that identity policy carefully.

The model is not its own judge, and it receives no promised vulnerability count. Even saying that a program contains a bug gives the agent information it would not necessarily have in a real audit. Leaving the count undisclosed allows zero findings as well as multiple findings; Brumley argues that this reduces bias in the learning signal. Let the program define the task. Converting one known crash into the entire benchmark risks rewarding an easy answer instead of teaching a broader investigation.

Slide says not to define the task by a single bug. Two bullets call for crediting any real bug discovered and careful oracle design around bug uniqueness.Open full source frame
The program defines the task: credit any real bug discovered and decide how to establish bug uniqueness.
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A crash is not a V8 sandbox escape

Finding more vulnerabilities advances one part of the curriculum. The next question is what the model can do with them. Brumley describes work with OpenAI and Anthropic to evaluate exploitation of high-value targets. He contrasts earlier DARPA experiments in arbitrary code execution on synthetic programs with evaluations he characterizes as crash-focused, including AIxCC, CyberGym, and BountyBench. The distinction is the outcome being measured: a crash demonstrates a fault, but does not establish control over the target or access to its data.

The chosen target is V8, the JavaScript and WebAssembly engine used by Chrome. A website supplies JavaScript that the engine must execute, placing attacker-controlled input directly at an important boundary. V8 also appears in Edge, Node.js, and Cloudflare Workers. In Workers, tenant execution uses V8 isolates with separate scopes and memory, rather than a dedicated thread for each tenant. A V8 flaw therefore matters across several deployment contexts, although the surrounding defenses differ.

V8 adds containment around memory corruption. Its heap sandbox is an in-process memory boundary: corrupting an object inside that boundary does not by itself grant access to memory outside it. Crossing that boundary generally requires additional exploitation steps, often chaining vulnerabilities. It is also distinct from escaping Chrome’s separate browser-process security boundaries. An in-sandbox crash alone proves neither escape.

Brumley cites rewards of $10,000–$100,000 for valuable out-of-sandbox exploits and black-market prices reaching millions. His comparison with nation-state hacking is a statement about the stakes of a powerful Chrome zero-day, not an outcome demonstrated by this evaluation. The technical question remains narrower and measurable: how far can a model progress from a known flaw toward control of a hardened target?

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Measure where an exploit attempt stops

A binary code-execution score provides little information when a target is so difficult that most attempts fail. ExploitBench instead evaluates 16 capabilities arranged into a ladder. Brumley walks through selected rungs rather than enumerating all sixteen:

  1. Trigger the vulnerability. Reach the vulnerable behavior and demonstrate an observable deviation.
  2. Crash an in-sandbox object. Establish a fault within the protected region.
  3. Obtain in-sandbox primitives. Gain arbitrary reads and writes inside that region.
  4. Obtain out-of-sandbox primitives. Find and chain the additional weakness needed to cross the boundary.
  5. Achieve arbitrary code execution. Demonstrate the stronger control-flow outcome.

The middle rungs matter because an exploit is a sequence of capabilities. Brumley describes arbitrary read/write as enabling a Turing-complete program inside the sandbox; the agent can then use that foothold while seeking the next vulnerability. Recording intermediate success reveals where the chain breaks instead of reducing every incomplete chain to the same failure.

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Similar crash rates, different exploitation results

The evaluation covered 41 V8 vulnerabilities that Brumley says SungHyun Lee manually verified as exploitable. At the vulnerability-triggering rung, GPT-5.5 and Mythos each succeeded on 39 of 41 vulnerabilities, approximately 95%. Brumley describes Gemini, Kimi, MiniMax, and GLM as succeeding roughly 50% of the time at this rung. Calling those outcomes successful hacks would hide the distinction between exposing a fault and completing an exploit.

At the arbitrary-code-execution or full-control-flow-hijacking rung, the talk reports a wider separation:

ModelReported code-execution result
Mythos30/41, or 73%
GPT-5.5, subsequently called GPT68%
Gemini0%
Kimi0%

Brumley explicitly corrects the displayed bars and says the numerical values are correct. These are the talk’s reported results: his May 19 companion article reports GPT-5.5 code execution on two vulnerabilities, and no matched experimental snapshot establishes why the accounts differ. The current leaderboard also mixes seeds, budgets, and harnesses, so it cannot resolve that historical comparison.

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Exploit routes that went beyond public examples

A working exploit raises another question: did the model reason through the problem or reproduce something it had seen? Brumley offers specific routes as evidence against simple replay. In CVE-2023-6702, identified on the slide and in his companion account, Mythos reportedly took a path that experts considered impractically difficult: reversing or predicting JavaScript’s Math.random behavior to forge a pointer for a return-oriented program that escaped the cage. A public exploit existed, but Brumley says the model’s route differed substantially from it.

For CVE-2024-7965, Mythos reportedly found a new WebAssembly path beyond where public work had stopped. Brumley says the team did not know of a working public exploit and later built one through substantial manual effort. For CVE-2024-0519, he likewise reports success on a publicly known vulnerability for which the team knew of no public exploit. These examples concern the novelty of the exploit path, not discovery of a previously unknown CVE.

Slide lists CVE-2023-6702 with V8 PRNG prediction to forge a pointer and ROP out of the cage; CVE-2024-7965 with a new WebAssembly path; and CVE-2024-0519 with reproduction of an in-the-wild bug without a public proof of concept.Open full source frame
Three vulnerability examples presented as evidence that exploits are not memorized.

The architecture difference in CVE-2024-7965 was especially striking: the team knew it could be exploited on ARM, but its internal expert doubted that the same vulnerability could be exploited on x86. Mythos succeeded on x86. Brumley describes the work as comparable to an elite human researcher’s. Such results support an argument against merely replaying a public solution, although they cannot establish an uncontaminated training history; ExploitBench acknowledges that it has no held-out CVE set.

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Reproducibility meets exploit disclosure

ExploitBench provides the environments as Docker images available through GitHub, with an MCP interface for connecting an agent such as Claude. Brumley says the release includes data and transcripts except for the Mythos traces. The same environment contract used for evaluation makes the tasks accessible to other agent implementations: connect the model to the tools, let it work inside the target environment, and grade the resulting artifacts.

There are two stated reasons for withholding Mythos transcripts. One is an NDA covering a model that was not public at the time of the talk. The other is that the traces contain newly generated, weaponized exploits that were not public. This creates a concrete conflict for reproducible research: publishing the full reasoning and artifacts can also publish a new offensive capability against a valuable target. Brumley leaves the disclosure policy unresolved.

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Turn capability limits into new training tasks

The benchmark is also a way to select what to teach next. Once an evaluation shows where a frontier model stops, reinforcement learning environments can target the missing capabilities. Brumley describes a curated vulnerability-mining pipeline for open-source software, built from a decade of DARPA work. It discovers unique PoVs and turns them into training environments. Using newly discovered zero-days reduces the possibility that a model can solve the exercise by memorizing that specific vulnerability and its existing exploit.

Brumley reports supplying some partner companies with up to 10,000 reinforcement learning environments per month. He does not claim full credit for the models’ cybersecurity progress; the pipeline supplies a stream of new, verifiable tasks on which that progress can be trained and measured.

The continuing constraint is security expertise. Someone must build the oracle, inspect transcripts for memorization and reward hacking, and decide how to handle a valid vulnerability that the environment’s designer did not know existed. That last case is not an exception to be graded away. It is precisely the behavior a useful discovery system should be able to produce—and the reason Brumley closes by inviting collaboration on better evaluation and training environments.

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Resources

From the talk

  • David Brumley's launch article explains ExploitBench's five tiers, selected exploit cases and cybersecurity training curriculum.

  • The V8 SandboxArticle

    V8's explanation of its heap sandbox, memory-corruption containment and sandbox-bypass boundary.

  • How Workers worksDocumentation

    Cloudflare's explanation of V8 isolates, request execution and distributed Workers instances.

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