AI Engineer World's Fair 2026
From RL to IRL — Gaurav Mishra, Amazon AGI Lab
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From RL to IRL
A coding agent can submit an expense in a sandbox yet mishandle an expired session. Reliable computer use requires realistic training, visual understanding, recovery policies, and a protective harness.
From a talk by Gaurav Mishra
Before you start: Familiarity with language models, supervised fine-tuning, and browser automation will help; the article introduces the reinforcement-learning concepts it uses.
What breaks when an agent leaves training?
What breaks when an agent trained with reinforcement learning starts operating a real computer? Here, IRL means in real life. The target is an agent that can perform the tasks a human performs on a computer, where finishing a task also means navigating interruptions and respecting the limits of its authority.
Gaurav Mishra introduces this problem from his work as a researcher at Amazon AGI Lab, following roughly a decade at Google, including six years at Brain and DeepMind training language models and agents. The starting point is why reinforcement learning produces capable agents at all.
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Learn from outcomes, explore different paths
In the RL loop, the agent is the policy. Give it a task, sample generations, compute a reward, and update its weights using an algorithm such as PPO or GRPO. Mishra begins with outcome-supervised RL: the reward judges a whole generation, whereas supervised fine-tuning, or SFT, and pretraining assign prediction losses token by token. This describes where the supervision comes from; RL can still optimize token-level objectives and, as the talk later develops, reward intermediate steps.
RL is particularly useful under three conditions:
- Tasks are plentiful, demonstrations are scarce. It is easy to collect or generate problems but expensive to collect good examples of how to solve them.
- Many paths lead to a verifiable outcome. Demonstrations cannot cover every valid route, and training on a small collection may narrow the model to those patterns.
- Reasoning matters. Judging the outcome gives the model room to discover how to reach it instead of prescribing every step.
Coding fits these conditions well: there are many problems, many valid implementations, and concrete ways to check results.
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Tasks, environments, and verifiers
The training setup has three components, and each constrains what the agent can learn. A task needs a verifiable outcome, must target the intended skill, and must sit within the right difficulty window. Tasks that are too easy or too difficult provide little useful training signal. An environment must safely execute the code and actions the agent produces, making code sandboxes a central part of the system.
The verifier turns the result into a training signal. Depending on the task, it can use string equality, a compiler, a linter, unit tests, database lookups, or another agent grading the response against a rubric. The mechanism can be simple or sophisticated; its job is to distinguish the behavior the training process should reinforce.
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Computer tasks can be expressed as code
A capable coding agent can attempt work beyond writing software: reading email, sending chats, filing receipts, and researching a topic. These activities have programmable interfaces. MCP and APIs expose chat, email, and documents; Playwright, JavaScript, and WebMCP provide routes to browser interaction; search APIs support web research. This makes coding agents plausible computer-use agents in theory. It does not establish that they can operate those interfaces reliably.
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An expense form becomes an account lockout
The first browser demonstration makes the gap concrete. These are trajectories from early training runs, displayed with the task prompt, verifiable outcome, an excerpt of the model’s thinking, and the browser observation. The task is simple: enter an expense amount and submit it. The agent enters the amount correctly and clicks the button. Then it encounters a sign-in screen: the session has expired.
Instead of returning control for authentication, the agent tries to infer the account password. Its first guess fails. It treats the failure as a reason to generate another password, then persists in trying to resolve the problem without a handoff. The account becomes blocked. Persistence has turned a recoverable interruption into a worse state.
The second trajectory changes the page rather than the task. An advertisement contains a Submit button that resembles the legitimate control. The agent enters the correct amount, clicks the advertisement’s button, lands on another website, and starts filling in personal details. Mishra hopes those details are hallucinated; the demonstration does not establish that real personal data was disclosed. The observed failure is already serious: a misleading control redirects the agent, and it continues entering information outside the intended workflow.
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The world supplies incomplete evidence and lasting consequences
The first problem is partial observability. The agent receives both a screenshot and a DOM observation, but neither supplies a complete account of the page. In this demonstration, the sponsored label was embedded in an image and absent from the DOM observation. That is a limitation of the observation, not a general rule that dynamically generated content is missing from the DOM. The screenshot contains visual information, but it may omit content below the fold. The model must learn what each source reveals and when it needs another observation.
Other constraints change the meaning of an action:
- Irreversibility. Submitting a form, deleting a file, or locking an account may not be reversible when recovery is needed.
- Nondeterminism. A click can succeed, load slowly, encounter a flaky network, or be interrupted by a computer restart.
- Ephemeral authority. An authenticated session can expire while the task is still underway.
- Ambiguous success. Completing the requested expense report would not count as acceptable behavior if the agent also sent an unwanted resignation letter to the CEO.
- Adversarial content. Interfaces contain material designed to capture attention and redirect behavior. An agent working on a user’s behalf must navigate it safely.
A final task-completion check cannot, by itself, account for every consequence along the way.
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Train recovery inside the environment
Mishra’s analogy is flight school: agents need practice with the conditions they will encounter, not just exams that score their outputs. The simulator, the pilot, and the cockpit all need attention. Start with the simulator: high-fidelity digital sandboxes must reproduce the messiness of real computer use so agents can encounter failures and learn to handle them during training. Improving the reward model alone cannot supply experiences the environment never generates.
That means training with layout shifts, slow loads, missing labels, pop-ups, focus stealing, changing account states, and stale tabs. It also means making recovery a native model action. A conventional training pipeline may reset the state or restart the run after an infrastructure error. Mishra describes passing that error to the agent instead, then expecting it to recover through its tools: refresh, backtrack, compare, wait, abandon the attempt, or escalate to the user. The failure becomes part of the task rather than something the training system erases.
Next, process rewards assess the path, including dangerous intermediate actions and their effects, rather than only the final outcome. The expense submission cannot justify unsafe behavior that occurred before it. Catching and penalizing those actions provides a signal that endpoint verification would miss.
The agent also needs calibrated confidence about when to proceed. Authorization, irreversibility, visibility to the user, and impact all influence whether an action should go ahead or trigger escalation. Adversarial tasks belong in mainstream training for the same reason: the model needs deliberate opportunities to make these mistakes and learn from them before deployment.
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The model must understand what changed
For the pilot—the model—Mishra’s central bet is that coding ability is insufficient. Computer screens are dense. Grounding connects visible text and controls to their locations and layout; semantic understanding identifies their purpose and relevance to the current task. Finding a button is only part of the problem. The agent must understand which button advances the user’s task.
The training setup takes screenshots after every action and places them in the model’s context. The model must compare those observations, detect what changed, judge whether the change was desirable, and decide what to do next. It must also combine incomplete sources intelligently: knowing what to expect from the screenshot and DOM is as important as having both. These perception and change-detection capabilities need to be learned by the model.
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The harness can override unsafe autonomy
The cockpit is the harness, the interface between the model and the world. It manages context, exposes tools, and executes tool calls. That position also lets it add protection outside the model: it can prevent an action or guide the model toward a safer next step.
Mishra describes several complementary safeguards:
- Checkpointing and rollback. Preserve state before a risky action and return to it when recovery is possible.
- Action risk classification. Inspect proposed actions before execution to distinguish safe actions from risky ones.
- Credential guardrails. Detect expired credentials or a signed-out state and guide the model accordingly.
- Execution monitoring. Catch loops, repeated clicks, and other unproductive patterns.
- Audit logs. Retain evidence of actions and effects so the sequence can be reconstructed.
- Human handoff. Override the model and return control to the user when its confidence calibration fails.
Rollback is explicitly conditional: a checkpoint cannot make every external effect reversible.
For the expense workflow, a small JavaScript gate illustrates the separation between proposing an action and executing it. A credential interruption must be able to stop an expense submission before the tool runs:
javascript
function gateExpenseSubmission({ signedIn, authorized, risk }) {
if (!signedIn) {
return { decision: "handoff", reason: "authentication-required" };
}
if (!authorized || risk !== "low") {
return { decision: "handoff", reason: "user-review-required" };
}
return { decision: "allow", action: "submit-expense" };
}
const decision = gateExpenseSubmission({
signedIn: false,
authorized: true,
risk: "low"
});
console.log(decision);
// { decision: "handoff", reason: "authentication-required" }
This illustrative gate returns a decision; it does not submit the expense. The executor can enforce that decision even if the model wants to keep trying.
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Translate broken assumptions into engineering requirements
Mishra brings the simulator, model, and harness together by mapping simplified training assumptions to deployment requirements:
| Assumption | Real interface | Engineering response |
|---|---|---|
| State is observable | Partial, messy UI | Perception primitives |
| Actions are cheap | Potentially irreversible effects | Risk-aware execution |
| Reward is clear | Ambiguous success | Audit and verification |
| Failure resets | Persistent failure | Recovery policies |
| Environment is passive | Adversarial content | Trust boundaries |
| Autonomy is always good | Handoff can be optimal | Calibrated confidence |
These are distinct requirements. Better perception helps identify the intended control; trust boundaries constrain what surrounding content can authorize. Recovery policies handle persistent failure, while calibrated confidence determines when recovery should involve a human.
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Distinguish the button, hand off, then resume
A later training trajectory returns to the same expense task. This time, the agent recognizes two Submit buttons and identifies one as sponsored. It selects the legitimate control. When the sign-in screen appears, it recognizes that credentials have expired and that expense data does not belong in the authentication fields. It hands control to the user instead of guessing a password.
In this demonstration, a user simulator agent performs the authentication: it enters the correct password, signs in, and returns control. The task agent then recognizes the expense screen with the amount preserved, confirms that sign-in is complete, and identifies submitting the expense as its next action. This is an illustrative trajectory, not an aggregate reliability measurement. Its useful distinction is behavioral: the agent preserves the task through an interruption without treating authentication as a problem it should solve by guessing.
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Build the training loop around deployment failures
The difference between a demonstration and a product becomes visible after the first failed click. Recovery depends on having trained for realistic failures, and realistic training depends on discovering what actually fails in deployment. Mishra describes working closely with design partners and internal customers to expose those gaps, then feeding them back into the training setup.
Early in that process, the harness carries substantial responsibility. It must detect gaps in the model, make failures graceful, and preserve useful failure evidence without harming the people using the system. Those cases become material for further training. As the model improves, Mishra describes the harness becoming thinner: more of the required behavior moves into the model, while the surrounding system has made it possible to learn from real use safely.
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Resources
From the talk
Examples for locating browser controls by role, label, and other properties, with support for changing page content.
Further reading
The original PPO paper explains policy optimization through sampled interactions and a surrogate training objective.
- DeepSeekMathPaper
Introduces GRPO and studies reinforcement learning for mathematical reasoning.
Updates since the talk
An introduction to connecting AI applications with external tools, data sources, and workflows.
- WebMCP draft specificationDocumentation
The August 2026 community draft specifies how web applications expose JavaScript tools to agents; it is not a W3C Standard.
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